Posts tagged Fed And The Markets
Some foreign words don’t have English translations that do them justice. Take the German “Schadenfreude,” for example. “Delight at the expense of another’s misfortune” just doesn’t quite pack the same punch. The Russian word “smutnoye” also defies a succinct English counterpart to fully import its meaning. Confusion, vagueness, a troubling sense that something nasty but not quite definable is lurking out there in the fog…these sentiments only partly get at the gist of the word. Russians, who over the course of their history have grown quite used to the presence of a potential fog-shrouded malignance out there in the fields, apply the term “smutnoye” to anything from awkward social encounters, to leadership vacuums in government, to drought-induced mass famines.
Who’s In Control?
We introduce the term “smutnoye” to this article not for an idle linguistic digression but because it seems appropriate to the lack of clarity about where we are in the course of the current economic cycle, and what policies central banks deem appropriate for these times. Recall that, just before the end of the second quarter, ECB chief Mario Draghi upended global bond markets with some musings on the pace of the Eurozone recovery and the notion that fiscal stimulus, like all good things in life, doesn’t last forever. Bond yields around the world jumped, with German 10-year Bunds leading the way as shown in the chart below.
At the time we were skeptical that Draghi’s comments signified some kind of sea change in central bank thinking (see our commentary for that week here). But bond yields kept going up in near-linear fashion, only pulling back a bit after Janet Yellen’s somewhat more dovish testimony to the US Congress earlier this week. And it has not just been the Fed and the ECB: hints of a change in thinking at the apex of the monetary policy world can be discerned in the UK and Canada as well. The sense many have is that central bankers want to wrest some control away from what they see as an overly complacent market. That, according to this view, is what motivated Draghi’s comments and what has credit market kibitzers focused like lasers on what words will flow forth from his mouth at the annual central bank confab in Jackson Hole next month.
Hard Data Doves
In that battle for control, and notwithstanding the recent ado in intermediate term credit yields, the markets still seem to be putting their money on the doves. The Fed funds futures index, a metric for tracking policy expectations, currently shows a less than 50 percent likelihood of a further rate hike this year, either in September or later – even though investors know full well that the Fed wants to follow through with one. Does that reflect complacency? A look at the hard data – particularly in regard to prices and wages – suggests common sense more than it does complacency. Two more headline data points released today add further weight to the view that another rate hike on the heels of June’s increase would be misguided.
US consumer prices came in below expectations, with the core (ex food & energy) CPI gaining 0.1 percent (versus the expected 0.2 percent) on the month, translating to a year-on-year gain of 1.7 percent. Retail sales also disappointed for what seems like the umpteenth time this year. The so-called control group (which excludes the volatile sectors of auto, gasoline and building materials) declined slightly versus an expected gain of 0.5 percent. These latest readings pile on top of last month’s tepid 1.4 percent gain in the personal consumer expenditure (PCE) index, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, and a string of earlier readings of a similarly downbeat nature.
Why Is This Cycle Different from All Other Cycles?
In her testimony to Congress this week, Yellen made reference to the persistence of below-trend inflation. The Fed’s basic policy stance on inflation has been that the lull is temporary and that prices are expected to recover and sustain those 2 percent targets. But Yellen admitted on Wednesday that there may be other, as-yet unclear reasons why prices (and employee wages) are staying lower for longer than an unemployment rate in the mid-4 percent range would normally suggest. This admission suggests that the Fed itself is not entirely clear as to where we actually are in the course of the economic recovery cycle that is in its ninth year and counting.
Equity markets have done a remarkable job at shrugging off this lack of clarity. Perhaps, like those Russian peasants of old, they are more focused on maximizing gain from the plot of land right under their noses while ignoring the slowly encroaching fog. Perhaps the fog will lift, revealing reason anew to believe a new growth phase lies ahead. All that remains to be seen; in the meantime, “smutnoye” remains the word of the moment.
Investors who like nice, clean narratives keep getting flummoxed by the global economy’s refusal to serve up steady sequences of consistent data points. This was a week, after all, when bond markets around the world took a Super Mario-sized beating in the wake of the ECB chairman’s musings about recovery and reflation in the Eurozone. The bond carnage even spilled into the seemingly Teflon stock market on Thursday. And yet, where did it all end? In the US, the latest reading on personal consumption expenditures (PCE), the Fed’s go-to inflation gauge, posted a weaker than expected year-on-year growth rate of 1.4 percent (both headline and ex-food & energy) on Friday. That same day the latest Eurozone flash CPI showed a 1.3 percent year on year gain, in line with expectations but down from the previous month. Reflation? Or could the bond market just possibly have jumped the gun a tad?
Phillips Curve to Nowhere
The May inflation numbers are, of course, representative of just one month. But there is very little in the longer term trend to suggest that this mythic reflation is anywhere on the horizon. The chart below shows the headline and core (ex-food & energy) PCE along with the US unemployment rate trend for the past five years.
The Fed pays closest attention to the core PCE rate (the green solid line) because it excludes the volatile categories of food and energy, and thus presents a steadier picture of underlying trends. As the chart shows, core PCE has fallen over the past five years from a high of 1.9 percent to the current level of 1.4 percent. Not once during this period has this rate surpassed the Fed’s desired target of 2.0 percent (the headline number was briefly above 2 percent, almost entirely on account of a commensurate rise in oil prices).
While prices have largely gone nowhere over this period, the complexion of the labor market has changed considerably. The unemployment rate (red dotted line) was over 8 percent in June 2012, and currently resides at 4.3 percent. Private nonfarm payrolls have made gains every single month over this period, the longest streak since the Bureau of Labor Statistics started recording this data shortly after the end of the Second World War. Normally, economists would expect this brisk pace of labor market growth to put upward pressure on wages and consumer prices. The Phillips Curve, bane of every Econ 101 student, came into existence to quantify this relationship, but its explanatory powers would appear to have diminished to the point of irrelevance.
Low Growth, Lowflation
When the “reflation trade” theme became the dominant market sentiment at the end of last year we expended a considerable number of words musing about just where all this growth was supposed to come from. Even the most wildly optimistic assumptions about a new bout of pro-growth fiscal policies from Washington, in our opinion, was not likely to change the basic growth equation: declining population growth, a smaller percentage of the population in the labor force and chronically low productivity together comprise a speed limit on how fast the economy can grow. If and when productivity were to return, it would quite plausibly come at the expense of jobs, as nonlinear advances in artificial intelligence and deep machine learning make real inroads into companies’ business operations. Why should we expect to see a major bout of reflation if this is the case?
This week’s bond market activity was significant. We are far from convinced that it marked the start of a paradigm shift away from the low rate environment of the past few years. The Fed may well raise rates again this year – it really, really wants to, and absent a major deviation from headline macro trends it could probably do so without too much risk of collateral damage. But unless some catalyst that we don’t see today shows up to push prices significantly higher, the urgency for the Fed to act again (or the ECB to start tapering) just won’t be there. And we are always just one unexpected market crisis away from the Greenspan-Bernanke-Yellen put coming out of the desk drawer and back into action.
Three years ago, one could have driven a fleet of semitrailers through the open space between the 2 year and the 10 year US Treasury benchmark note yields. While there still is some distance between the two, it would be somewhat more amenable to a single row of Priuses (Prii?) passing through. As the chart below shows, the shorter term note, which is generally more directly responsive to Fed policy, remains very close to its five year high. The intermediate 10 year yield, by contrast, has meandered along a largely directionless trajectory.
Untangling Policy, Demand and Expectations
The path of shorter term yields, for which the 2 year note is a useful proxy, is not hard to understand. The Fed began to make noises about tapering its QE policy in 2013 and then moved to a regime of reasonably explicit forward guidance on rates in 2015, resulting in the first increase at the end of that year. Despite falling sharply during the turmoil of early 2016, the 2 year resumed its upward path as conditions settled down and the case for a steady, if not spectacular, pace of economic recovery settled in as the default narrative. One should expect short term yields to continue tracking upwards in the absence of a reversal of the Fed’s stated intentions to keep raising rates.
For much of this time, the 10 year benchmark marched to a different drummer. Foreign demand was a key determinant of the consistently subdued yields experienced over this time – a trend that confounded no small number of bond pros. Rather than breaching 3 percent, as many expected, the 10 year actually set an all-time low – as in “since the founding of the American Republic all-time low” – in the immediate aftermath of Brexit.
The November election and the emergence of the so-called “reflation trade” brought about a shift in expectations, such that both intermediate and short yields moved largely in tandem. This was, as you will recall, when the prevailing mindset among investors imagined dramatic changes to the tax code and a sweeping new program of public spending on infrastructure. The spread between the 10 year and the 2 year in the weeks leading up to the election was mostly below 100 basis points, and it has not strayed very far from that level since.
Mind the Gap
The question now, of course, is whether there is still enough oomph in those reflationary expectations to send the 10 year into higher territory with a resulting steepening of the curve. This would be the putatively logical case to make for one who still believes there’s an infrastructure/tax reform pony out back with the capability to deliver the economic growth bump (however short-lived that might be) that is the administration’s central economic talking point. This view would consider the recent string of so-so hard data releases (including today’s six-of-one-half-dozen-of-the-other retail sales and inflation results) to be temporary and primed for near-term growth.
On the other hand, if the gap narrows still further – if the spread falls back into double digits as short term rates inch up while intermediates hold steady or fall again – investor brains could fall prey to the dark sentiments of an flat or inverted yield curve. That outcome would likely serve as a validation for those opining that bond yields represented the “smart view” while equity valuations soared on little more than a wing and a prayer.
The $4.5 Trillion Dollar Question
In the midst of all this is one very important and highly unpredictable variable: when and how the Fed plans to begin drawing down the $4.5 trillion balance sheet it racked up over the course of three quantitative easing programs. Observers will pay closer than usual attention to the forthcoming release of the FOMC’s minutes (scheduled for May 24) from its most recent policy meeting, scouring the language for clues about their intentions. The conventional wisdom is that the Fed believes there will eventually come a time when it needs to take rates back to zero and possibly launch another bout of QE. Having the dry powder to launch such a plan will necessitate a meaningful balance sheet reduction in the meantime. The tricky part, of course, will be to pull of this maneuver without roiling asset markets in so doing. Given the preternatural calm prevailing in risk asset markets currently, any hiccup could turn into a negative catalyst. Fed members will need to be practicing their triple-axel techniques to pull this off.
Fed-watching isn’t quite the sport it was one year ago. The investing herds these days tend to be more fixated on tweets than on dot-plots. Nonetheless, the FOMC will meet again in eleven days, and what they decide to do (or not do) in January and beyond will have an impact on fixed income portfolios. The consensus wisdom is that rates are likely to rise. But direction is only one aspect of managing interest rate exposure; the other is shape – as in shape of the yield curve. Short and intermediate term rates have done anything but move in lockstep over the past several years. We think it is a good time to step back and consider the variables that may be at play in influencing the shape of the curve in the coming months.
A very odd thing happened the last time the Fed engineered a sustained policy of rate increases. The chart below shows the Fed funds target rate going back to 2000, along with the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields.
The Greenspan Fed began raising rates in June 2004, taking the Fed funds target rate from 1.0 percent to 5.25 percent over a two year period (the green dotted line on the chart shows this ascent). Short term market rates moved accordingly; the 2-year yield started moving up ahead of the Fed, probably due to the expectations game and a sense that economic recovery was at hand. Longer term rates, though, barely moved at all. In fact, by the time the policy action topped out, the yield curve was essentially flat between 2-year and 10-year maturities.
Greenspan pronounced himself confused by this and called it a “conundrum.” His successor Ben Bernanke had done his own homework, though, and figured out what was going on. Many central banks around the world, particularly in Asia, had been burned by the currency crisis of 1997 and subsequently embarked on disciplined programs of building up their foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile China, which had emerged relatively unscathed from the ’97 crisis, had its own reasons for stockpiling FX reserves: it was a means of keeping its domestic currency from getting too expensive while the country’s value of exports soared. What are all those FX reserves comprised of? Treasury securities, mostly. So the Greenspan conundrum was nothing more than good old fashioned supply and demand; as foreign central banks built up ever-higher mountains of reserves, the demand kept Treasury prices up and yields down. The effect was more pronounced at the intermediate and long end of the curve, which tend to be less influenced by domestic monetary policy and more influenced by other economic variables.
As the above chart shows, the expectations game with short-term rates has had some crazy moments in the past few years. Note, first of all, that the 2-year did not follow the Fed funds rate all the way down to zero as the central bank responded to the 2008 recession and market crash. The 2-year hung around the one percent level for much of the time until the second half of 2010 – the time leading into when the Fed launched its second wave of quantitative easing. The 2-year finally converged with the Fed funds (the upper band of the zero – 0.25 percent range) after the Eurozone crisis and debt ceiling debacle of summer 2011.
But the expectations game began anew in 2013 when then-Chair Bernanke mused openly about tapering the QE activity, Since that time, despite a handful of reversals, the trend in short-term rates has been resolutely higher. Market expectations ran ahead of the Fed, falling back only in 2016 when the FOMC blinked on successive occasions and held off on rate increases.
Yellen and the Tweets
While short term rates moved decisively off their 2011 and 2013 lows, intermediate rates once again behaved very differently. The 10-year yield actually set an all-time low in 2016 – yes, that was the cheapest 10-year debt has ever been in the history of the American republic. Again, the culprit appears to be supply and demand. In an age of negative interest rates, the meager two percent yield is king. Demand from institutional investors like insurance companies and pension funds, pushed out of other sovereign markets from the Eurozone to Switzerland and Japan, allocated larger chunks to intermediate and long Treasuries.
What does this mean for the remainder of 2017? A rational assessment of short-term movements, based on where rates are today and assuming the Fed goes through with at least two more rate hikes over the year, is that short-term rates might nudge up another 50 basis points or so. At the short end of the curve we think floating rate exposure remains attractive as a defense, particularly if the expectations game gets ahead of itself again.
The bigger challenge lies in those intermediate exposures. Negative rates still persist in Swiss and Japanese 10-year paper, but intermediate Bunds have trended decisively higher in recent weeks. The reflation trade that took hold right after the US election has meanwhile pushed the 10-year Treasury within striking distance of three percent. If the first month or so of the new administration gives the market cause to wrap itself even more tightly around this theme, then it may be a very painful year for fixed income portfolios. On the other hand – and we tend to see this as a more likely possibility – if the Trump trade is already overextended then we would expect to see less drama in the middle and long end of the curve, and still-healthy demand from those yield-seeking institutions.
An orderly and gradual rate increase policy was no doubt at the top of Janet Yellen’s list of New Year wishes. The overall economic environment would seem ready to cooperate with that intention. But she will have to deal with the possibility that tweets will do more to shape the curve than will dot-plots.
Fiscal policy is where all the cool kids hang out now, as we noted in last week’s commentary. But the monetary policy nerds at the Fed got at least a modicum of attention this week as the dots settled on the Fed funds plot chart Wednesday afternoon. As was widely expected, the meeting resulted in a 0.25 percent target rate hike and some meaningful, if subtle, changes to the 2017 outlook. Three policy actions are on tap for next year, and this time the market seems to take this outlook seriously. Chair Yellen & Co. expect the recently favorable trends in output growth and employment to continue, while expecting to see headline prices reach the two percent target by 2018. These observations appear to be largely irrespective of what does or does not happen with all the hyped-up fiscal policy that has been driving markets of late. Be well advised: monetary policy will still matter, quite a bit, in 2017. It will have an impact on many things, not least of which will be the opportunity set of fiscal policy choices.
Divergent Today, Insurgent Tomorrow
Market watchers on Wednesday made much of the (temporary, as it turns out) pullback in stock indexes in post-FOMC trading. But the real action, as has often been the case in the last six weeks, was in the bond market. The yield spike is noteworthy in absolute terms, but even more striking on a relative basis. Consider the chart below, showing the spread between the 2-year U.S. Treasury note and its German Bund counterpart.
Short-term U.S. rates are at 52-week highs while German rates are at their 2016 lows. The spread between the two is wider, at 2.07 percent, than it has been at any time since 2003. Remember divergence? That was the big theme in the discourse one year ago, when the Fed followed through on its 2015 policy action last December. The Eurozone and Bank of Japan were full steam ahead with their respective stimulus programs as the Fed prepared to zag in the other direction. Then markets hit a speed bump in January, the Fed backed off any further action and rates came back down. As the above chart shows, U.S. and German short-term rates followed a more or less similar trajectory for most of the year.
But divergence is back with vengeance. Holders of U.S. dollar-denominated assets will be pleased, as the euro gets pushed ever closer to parity. Policy divergence leads to dollar insurgence. On the negative side, that insurgence looks set to redouble the FX headwinds that have clipped corporate top line revenue growth for much of the past two years. That, in turn, will make it challenging to achieve the kind of double-digit earnings growth investors are banking on to justify another couple laps of the bull market.
Three Times the Charm?
What we took away from Chair Yellen’s post-meeting press conference was a sense that the Fed’s world view has changed only modestly amid all the hoopla of the post-election environment. She took pains to note that the outlook shift to three possible rate changes in 2017 does not reflect a seismic change in thinking among the dot-plotters, but an incremental shift reflecting a somewhat more positive take on the latest growth, employment and price data.
And fiscal policy? Yellen could hardly avoid the topic; it was the point of the vast majority of the questions she fielded from the press. Over the course of her tenure at the Fed she has spoken many times of the need for monetary and fiscal policy to complement each other at appropriate times in the business cycle. This, however, may not be one of those times. Consider her comment in response to one question: “So I would say at this point that fiscal policy is not obviously needed to help get us back to full employment.” For the moment, at least, and in the absence of any tangible data to suggest otherwise, the Fed does not appear to be giving undue attention to the fiscal variable.
As Location Is To Real Estate, Productivity Is to Growth
Chair Yellen did make a point of emphasizing what kind of fiscal policy she does like: namely, that which directly helps boost productivity. That’s a point you have heard us make in this space ad nauseum, so it was good to hear it from the Eccles Building. What kind of fiscal policy could that be? Education, jobs and skills training programs and improving the quality of installed capital used by American workers were specifically called out by the Fed chair. Of course, there is no clarity of any kind that such productivity-friendly programs will make it through the legislative sausage factory. One can always hope, though.