Posts tagged Market Impact Events
The equity market bulls had been running for more than five years. Over this time interest rates had come down dramatically, inflation was muted and most every fiscal quarter delivered a reasonably predictable uptick in real GDP growth. Markets had weathered a spate of political and financial scandals, as well as occasionally unnerving geopolitical flashpoints. All in all, there seemed to be no particular reason to complain or worry as summer transitioned to fall. Yet investors were edgy. A certain element of caution held in check what should have been giddy times on Wall Street, as if traders and investment bankers, contemplating their seven and eight figure bonuses, couldn’t shake the feeling that it was all a bit unreal. It’s quiet in here, said the young MBAs at Morgan and Salomon to each other as they stared at the monochrome numbers flashing silently on their Quotrons. It’s too quiet.
The previous paragraph could easily be imagined as some future market historian recalling the strange bull market of 2017 – up to the last sentence, anyway. Salomon Brothers is long deceased, and the cathode ray tubes of yesteryear’s Quotrons lie dormant in landfills, patiently awaiting the archaeologists of future millennia. No, the year in question is 1987. On October 19 of that year, a sudden flash of lightning made a direct hit on US equity markets. Major market indexes fell more than 20 percent in one day – the technical definition of a bear market. On October 20, market pros stumbled around the canyons of lower Manhattan asking: What happened?
Thirty years on, another generation of markets pros -- contemplating another secular bull amid low interest rates, steady economic growth and uncomfortably subdued volatility – asks a different question: could it happen again?
A Bear By Any Other Name
The chart below provides a quick snapshot of the Black Monday carnage – and the quick recovery thereafter.
That vertigo-inducing plunge on October 19 put the stock market squarely in bear territory, after a bull run that began in August 1982. But look how quickly the market recovered. By July of 1989 the S&P 500 had regained its pre-crash high. This new bull would go on running for more than a decade, ending only with the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000. For this reason, even though the 1987 market crash was technically a bear market event, we describe it in conversations with clients more as a disruption in the Great Growth Market that ran for 18 years (from 1982 to 2000). We think it is important to make this distinction. Secular bear markets, like the 14 years between 1968 and 1982, call for specific portfolio strategies. But there is very little that one can do about a sudden pullback like Black Monday. To respond to that question we identified above – could a 1987-style event happen again? – our answer is yes. Most certainly it could, and in the next couple paragraphs we will share our thoughts as to why. But a pullback based on some one-off exogenous risk factors – however steep – is not the same thing as a true bear market.
Portfolio Insurance: “Algo” Trading’s Beta Version
So what caused Black Monday? It took quite a while for the market experts of the day to put the pieces of the puzzle together, but in the end they identified the culprit: portfolio insurance. This seemingly benign term encapsulated an approach to institutional portfolio management that involved computer-driven signals to act as warning bells when market conditions appeared risky. Sound familiar? It should, because the crude hedging strategies that made up portfolio insurance circa 1987 were the ancestors of today’s ultra-sophisticated quantitative strategies known by those in the game as “algo” (for “algorithm”) trading.
If you look at the chart above you will see that, a few days before Black Monday, the stock market moved meaningfully lower after soaring to new record highs. For a combination of reasons involving the rate of change in the market’s advances and declines, underlying volatility and a few other factors, the portfolio insurance triggers kicked in and began selling off positions to build hedges. On October 16, the Friday before the crash, the S&P 500 pulled back more than 5 percent as the hedging begat more hedging. On Monday morning the sell orders cascaded in, but there were no buyers. That’s what brought about the carnage.
Peaks and Troughs
Given how much money is currently invested in the offspring of portfolio insurance, the really interesting question is not “could it happen again?” but rather “why hasn’t it happened more often?” For one thing, the ’87 crash did bring about some institutional reforms – operational circuit-breakers and the like – to try and minimize the damage a tidal wave of one-directional orders could bring about. These safeguards have worked on a number of occasions.
For another, the vast diversity of quantitative strategies itself is a kind of check and balance. Every algo program has its own set of triggers: buy when the German Bund does X, sell when Janet Yellen says Y, write a bunch of straddles when China’s monthly FX reserve outflows top $100 million. Put all these out there in the capital markets and they act sort of like the ocean when the peak of one wave collides into the trough of another – they cancel each other out. But that is reassuring only up to a point. It is not hard to imagine that a perfect storm of signals could converge and send all the algo triggers moving in the same direction – everyone wants to sell, no one wants to buy. Crash!
Lessons from the Crash
So, if such a perfect storm were to happen and blindside portfolios with massive short term losses, are there lessons to be learned from 1987? Quite so. It should be clear from the above chart that the worst thing an investor could have done on October 20, 1987 would have been to sell in a panic. In fact, those of us who have been at this long enough to remember the day (and do we ever!) recall that Wall Street’s trading rooms were never more frenzied with buy orders than in the weeks after Black Monday. Portfolio managers may not have yet known exactly why the crash happened – but they knew that the macroeconomic context hadn’t changed, that there were no new geopolitical crises, and that stocks with stratospheric P/E ratios after a long bull run were suddenly super-cheap. That, largely, is what explains the quick recovery, explains why 1987 was not a “real” bear market and explains why, all else remaining more or less unchanged, the prudent response to an out-of-the-blue event is to stay disciplined.
Jackson Hole is, by all accounts, a lovely redoubt, high up in the Rocky Mountains of Wyoming. As has been the case every August since 1978, the monetary mandarins who set the agenda for the world’s central banks will dutifully traipse up to this hiking and skiing paradise next week for their annual economic symposium. The attention span of the global investment community will briefly train its attention on Jackson Hole, and not on account of the riveting topics on tap for keynote speeches and panel confabs. This year’s symposium title is “Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy,” an anodyne and, in this contentious day and age, somewhat wistful formulation. If nothing else, though, it at least rolls off the tongue more easily than last year’s unfortunate word salad of a lead line: “Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future.” Central banker says what?
Euron a Roll
No, investors’ interest in the proceedings will be strictly limited to whatever policy utterances may spring forth from the lips of bankers, none more so than European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. A frisson of anticipation rippled in late June from Draghi’s musings about the stronger than expected pace of recovery in the Eurozone. These musings, not unlike Ben Bernanke’s “taper” kerfuffle of May 2013, sent bond markets and the euro into a tizzy as investors imagined the beginning of the end of Eurozone QE. The euro in particular went on a tear, as the chart below illustrates:
So much did the currency respond to fears of a more aggressive QE taper by the ECB that a strong euro has replaced a strong Eurozone as the central bank’s chief concern, as revealed by the most recent ECB minutes published this week. The euro’s strength puts regional companies at a competitive disadvantage for their exports, and complicates the ECB’s elusive target of 2 percent inflation. The characteristically cautious and incremental Draghi is thus likely to be on his guard to avoid any comments that could be interpreted by the market as hawkish policy leanings. Those tuning into the Jackson Hole proceedings may well come away with little more than the bland sentences peppered with bursts of arcane math that make up the majority of central bank speeches. More likely, investors will have to wait until the ECB’s next policy meetings in September and October for guidance on the timing of QE tapering.
The Smell of Fear
Concerns about the euro come at the same time as a smattering of long-dormant volatility comes back into risk asset markets. The CBOE VIX index has found a new home above 15 in recent days – still below the commonly accepted fear threshold of 20, but well above the sub-10 all-time lows it has plumbed for much of the past several months. Global stock indexes have experienced some attendant turbulence in the form of 1 percent-plus intraday pullbacks – fairly tame by historical norms but enough to re-ignite the chatter about the duration of this bull market, expensive valuations and all the rest.
It’s been awhile since shaky asset markets have tested central bankers’ nerves. Nor is there any clear indication that this late summer volatility will develop into anything more than a brief passing thunderstorm or two. But we have sufficient evidence from recent history that the policymakers do react to asset prices. They will likely be wary of pushing too hard for normalization policies (tapering on the part of the ECB, balance sheet reduction and further rate hikes for the Fed) if they sense that such moves will feed into already jittery capital markets.
Chances are that the only “hikes” on the agenda at Jackson Hole will be the kind involving nature’s beauty, not interest rates. We don’t expect much from Wyoming to be moving markets next week. But the central bankers still face a dilemma: how to proceed with the normalization they so want to accomplish when (a) market reactions could be troublesome, and (b) the urgency from a macroeconomic perspective is not clear and present. This will be one of the key contextual themes, we believe, heading into the fall.
Over the past few months, we’ve had a number of conversations with clients that go something like this:
Client: Wow, these are crazy times, huh? Politics! Never seen anything like this!
Us: Yep, they sure are crazy times.
Client: So, why does the stock market keep going up? When should I be worried?
In today’s commentary we will address this concern, and explain why we believe that, whatever one thinks of the political dynamics playing out here at home or abroad, it probably is not a good idea to transpose these sentiments onto a view of portfolio allocation. Political risk is a real thing. But history has shown there to be very little causal relationship between momentous political events and movements in risk asset markets. Any market environment, whether bull or bear, is affected by tens of thousands of variables every day, many of which have little correlation with each other, and very few of which are easy to pinpoint and ascribe to prime mover status. We offer up a case study in support of this claim: the US stock market in the early 1970s that encompassed the Nixon Watergate scandal.
That Dreary Seventies Market
President Nixon resigned from office in August, 1974, shortly after it became clear that Congress was preparing to commence impeachment proceedings in the wake of the revelations about the Watergate crimes and attempted cover-up by the administration. As the chart below shows, the S&P 500 fell quite a bit during the month of August 1974, as well as before and after the Nixon resignation. But the chart also shows that there was a lot else going on at the same time.
The Nixon resignation remains to date the most consequential political scandal in modern American history. It had an earth-shaking effect on the political culture in Washington, leading to far-reaching attempts by lawmakers to restore the integrity of the systems and institutions the scandal had tarnished. As far as markets were concerned, though, Watergate was far down the list of events giving investors headaches. Following a historically unprecedented period of economic growth and rise in living standards over the prior two decades, the first five years of the 1970s witnessed two wrenchingly painful recessions, spiraling inflation and a gut-punch to household budgets in the form of OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo. The freefall in stocks that took place in 1973 and 1974, if it is to be tied to any specific catalyst, flows from the real dollars-and-cents impact of the embargo and the recession. Watergate, as important as it was as a political event, was little more than a blip on a radar screen already filled with bad news.
Tweets Come and Go, Markets Carry On
Which brings us back to today’s daily carnival of the bizarre from the banks of the Potomac Drainage Basin. While the tweets fly and the heads of the high priests of conventional wisdom explode, the economy…well, just chugs along at more or less the same pace it has for the past several years. Today’s initial Q2 GDP reading (2.6 percent, slightly below expectations) sets us up for another year of growth averaging somewhere around 2 percent. The labor market is healthy, there is neither hyperinflation nor deflation, and corporate earnings growth is trending close to double digits. No major world economy appears in imminent danger of a lurch to negative growth.
Yes, stock prices are expensive by most reasonable valuation measures. And yes, there is not much in the way of sector leadership momentum. But until and unless we see compelling signs of a shift away from this uncannily stable macro context, we see little evidence that Washington shenanigans will have much of an impact on stocks. At some point, those tens of thousands of global variables at play will deliver up a different set of considerations and necessitate new strategic thinking. Trying to time the precise market impact, as always, is a fool’s errand.
Some foreign words don’t have English translations that do them justice. Take the German “Schadenfreude,” for example. “Delight at the expense of another’s misfortune” just doesn’t quite pack the same punch. The Russian word “smutnoye” also defies a succinct English counterpart to fully import its meaning. Confusion, vagueness, a troubling sense that something nasty but not quite definable is lurking out there in the fog…these sentiments only partly get at the gist of the word. Russians, who over the course of their history have grown quite used to the presence of a potential fog-shrouded malignance out there in the fields, apply the term “smutnoye” to anything from awkward social encounters, to leadership vacuums in government, to drought-induced mass famines.
Who’s In Control?
We introduce the term “smutnoye” to this article not for an idle linguistic digression but because it seems appropriate to the lack of clarity about where we are in the course of the current economic cycle, and what policies central banks deem appropriate for these times. Recall that, just before the end of the second quarter, ECB chief Mario Draghi upended global bond markets with some musings on the pace of the Eurozone recovery and the notion that fiscal stimulus, like all good things in life, doesn’t last forever. Bond yields around the world jumped, with German 10-year Bunds leading the way as shown in the chart below.
At the time we were skeptical that Draghi’s comments signified some kind of sea change in central bank thinking (see our commentary for that week here). But bond yields kept going up in near-linear fashion, only pulling back a bit after Janet Yellen’s somewhat more dovish testimony to the US Congress earlier this week. And it has not just been the Fed and the ECB: hints of a change in thinking at the apex of the monetary policy world can be discerned in the UK and Canada as well. The sense many have is that central bankers want to wrest some control away from what they see as an overly complacent market. That, according to this view, is what motivated Draghi’s comments and what has credit market kibitzers focused like lasers on what words will flow forth from his mouth at the annual central bank confab in Jackson Hole next month.
Hard Data Doves
In that battle for control, and notwithstanding the recent ado in intermediate term credit yields, the markets still seem to be putting their money on the doves. The Fed funds futures index, a metric for tracking policy expectations, currently shows a less than 50 percent likelihood of a further rate hike this year, either in September or later – even though investors know full well that the Fed wants to follow through with one. Does that reflect complacency? A look at the hard data – particularly in regard to prices and wages – suggests common sense more than it does complacency. Two more headline data points released today add further weight to the view that another rate hike on the heels of June’s increase would be misguided.
US consumer prices came in below expectations, with the core (ex food & energy) CPI gaining 0.1 percent (versus the expected 0.2 percent) on the month, translating to a year-on-year gain of 1.7 percent. Retail sales also disappointed for what seems like the umpteenth time this year. The so-called control group (which excludes the volatile sectors of auto, gasoline and building materials) declined slightly versus an expected gain of 0.5 percent. These latest readings pile on top of last month’s tepid 1.4 percent gain in the personal consumer expenditure (PCE) index, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, and a string of earlier readings of a similarly downbeat nature.
Why Is This Cycle Different from All Other Cycles?
In her testimony to Congress this week, Yellen made reference to the persistence of below-trend inflation. The Fed’s basic policy stance on inflation has been that the lull is temporary and that prices are expected to recover and sustain those 2 percent targets. But Yellen admitted on Wednesday that there may be other, as-yet unclear reasons why prices (and employee wages) are staying lower for longer than an unemployment rate in the mid-4 percent range would normally suggest. This admission suggests that the Fed itself is not entirely clear as to where we actually are in the course of the economic recovery cycle that is in its ninth year and counting.
Equity markets have done a remarkable job at shrugging off this lack of clarity. Perhaps, like those Russian peasants of old, they are more focused on maximizing gain from the plot of land right under their noses while ignoring the slowly encroaching fog. Perhaps the fog will lift, revealing reason anew to believe a new growth phase lies ahead. All that remains to be seen; in the meantime, “smutnoye” remains the word of the moment.
Anyone who has lived for some time in a city like Los Angeles or Tokyo knows what an inconsequential tremor is. You feel that shaking motion, perhaps hear some objects rattling on your desk. You momentarily catch your breath, and then it’s all over, usually within the span of less than ten seconds. Those inconsequential tremors happen frequently in any city with proximity to a major tectonic fault line. Only rarely – very, very rarely – do they develop into a serious earthquake capable of creating lasting damage.
Pullbacks by the Numbers
As with seismic tremors, so with financial markets. Our natural inclination is to not even categorize Wednesday’s 1.8 percent pullback in the S&P 500 as a tremor. Since it did briefly puncture the preternaturally serene calm prevailing in markets as of late, though – and come as it did amidst a new level of political volatility in Washington – we think this is a good time to dust off that pullback study – long unused – and remind our clients that tremors generally do not an earthquake make.
Our standard measure for a “pullback event” as it pertains to US large cap stocks is a retreat of five percent or more from a high water mark, followed by a subsequent recovery of five percent or more. There is no higher truth associated with the five percent threshold, but we think it is a useful benchmark. A five percent decline has impact – the TV talking heads take notice and investors feel those ephemeral goosebumps – but it falls short of a technical correction (10 percent off the high) or a bear market (20 percent retreat).
By this standard, there have been 190 pullback events on the S&P 500 since the end of the Second World War, or about 2.7 every year, on average, for the 71 years between then and now. And how many times did the pullbacks metastasize into full-fledged bear markets? Well, there was a very brief bear – about seven months in duration – from the end of 1961 to midsummer 1962. There was the dismal stretch from the record high of November 1968 to August 1982, which is how long it took for the S&P 500 to forever rise above that (nominal) ’68 high and bid it goodbye. And there were the two bear markets that bookended the first decade of the 21st century.
And that’s pretty much it for bear markets (Black Monday 1987, yeah, but that was basically a flash crash, not a bear proper). Mostly, those pullback events are just inconsequential tremors with no particular sustaining narrative. Revolutions, it is often noted by political historians, don’t happen far more often than they do happen.
Much Ado About Nothing
No two bear markets are alike, but the forces that propel them tend to arise organically from the thousands of disparate nodes of activity in the economy, and not from singular events in Washington DC. Whatever outcomes happen as a result of the current political and legal woes of the Trump administration – even the more far-fetched notions of some form of removal from office or a doubling-down of the crazy by the current residents of 1600 Pennsylvania – are highly unlikely to exert a meaningful impact on the economy at large. The slow-growth recovery continues at home and abroad. Quarterly earnings seem able to sustain at least mid-high single digit growth rates over a full fiscal year. These trends preceded Trump, and these trends seem likely to keep on keeping on.
We have no trouble imagining a near-term scenario that registers another five percent-plus pullback event in keeping with our definition above. We haven’t had one since February 2016, and that’s a long dry spell (remember that 2.7 events per year statistic we cited above). In the absence of any data implying a potential meaningful shift in the overall economic narrative, though, we are likely to consider any such event as yet another inconsequential tremor.