Posts tagged Market Impact Events
It hasn’t been quite the V-shaped recovery of many pundit prognostications. The S&P 500 briefly entered technical correction territory last month, and flirted ever so coquettishly with the 200-day moving average, a key technical trend variable. The ensuing relief rally has seen a couple peaks, but is still climbing the wall back to the record close of 2872 reached on January 26. A month and a half may not seem like a long time – and it’s really not a long time, in the great scheme of things. But other recent pullbacks have done a better job at channeling their inner Taylor Swifts to “shake it off.” The chart below show the pace of the current recovery (leftmost diagram) compared to the brief pullbacks experienced after 2016’s Brexit vote (middle) and the mini-freakout over Ebola in 2014 (right).
So at 42 days, we’re a bit behind the brisk pace of the Brexit (30 days) and Ebola (27 days) pullback-recovery events. But it’s not too much of a stretch to imagine the S&P 500 finding itself scaling the rest of that wall to 2872 in the not so very distant future. Over the course of the current recovery, investors have learned to build an impressive immunity to what one might consider to be bad news. In a sense this is an acquired habit, courtesy of the world’s major central banks.
It Was Just Nine Years Ago Today, Ben Bernanke Taught the Band to Play
Speaking of the “current recovery,” today is its nine year anniversary! Three cheers for the bull. On March 9, 2009 US equity markets hit rock-bottom, more than 50 percent down from their previous highs in the largest market reversal since the Great Depression. Investors in early 2009 were catatonic – many who had managed to keep their heads during the freefalls in September and October of the previous year finally capitulated in March, fearing there was potentially no bottom for risk assets.
Those who held off the demons of fear one last time were rewarded mightily as stocks found solid ground and began the long trek back. But it was not exactly easy street for those first tentative years. 2010 witnessed a handful of significant pullbacks and lots of angst. In 2011 the market flirted with bear territory (20 percent or more down) when the Eurozone crisis accelerated and the US Congress came ever so close to defaulting on the national debt. Other potential black swans lurked in the following years, from government shutdowns to the crash in oil prices to fears of a hard landing in China.
But as each news cycle came and went investors learned to stop worrying. Credit for this learned behavior can confidently be laid at the feet of Ben Bernanke, Mario Draghi, Haruhiko Kuroda and Janet Yellen, along with a supporting cast of dovish policymakers in their respective central banks. The “central bank put” was solidly in the money and increased in value throughout the recovery, even as the US Fed started to lead the way out of monetary Eden as it ended quantitative easing and began to raise rates. The investor calculus was simple: things will work out, and if they don’t, the banks will step in and bail us out. This way of thinking finally led to that unreal calm in the markets in 2017. Even the wackiest of political shenanigans failed to make an imprint on investors trained to embrace the Panglossian assurance of the best of all possible worlds for risk assets.
O Brave New World, That Hath Such Creatures In It
If the central bank put is the magic formula for maintaining calm, what to make of the tea leaves from recent statements by Yellen’s successor, Jerome Powell? The new Fed chair has been largely unimpressed by the recent market volatility and appears to see no reason for soothing bedtime stories to global investors. That should be a good sign: if the economy is doing well on its own, then markets should be able to take in stride the upward movement in interest rates and inflation that one would expect to follow from rising corporate sales and earnings. Nonetheless, it is a brave new world from the recent past.
Taken this way, it makes sense to ascribe the February pullback to nothing of any particular importance. The pullback started with a jobs report that showed wages growing at a 2.9 percent annual rate, higher than the recent trendline of 2.5 percent or so (though not particularly hot by historical standards). Trump threw some new fire on the flames last week with the unexpected announcement of punitive new tariffs on steel and aluminum. But the ingrained tendency to remain calm has largely prevailed. The general thinking on tariffs seems to be that they will fail to ignite an all-out hot trade war. Meanwhile, this morning’s jobs report had a double helping of good news, with a whopping 313,000 payroll gains alongside an underwhelming (therefore good!) average wage gain of 2.6 percent.
What if the wisdom of the crowd is wrong? What if dysfunctional politics and misguided fiscal policymaking still do matter? What if that productivity boom that is supposed to arrive any day now fails to show up, relegating the world economy to sub-par growth as far as the eye can see? Will there be another incarnation of the central bank put? Will it be as effective as it was for the last nine years? All questions without answers, for now. For the time being, though, it would appear that the news cycle will continue to leave investors unimpressed, where the smell of bad news must mean there’s a pony nearby. Your portfolio should enjoy this while it lasts.
Stop us if you’ve heard this one before. As the end of the year approaches, investor attention suddenly focuses, laser-like, on China’s financial system. Share markets stumble on the Chinese mainland and in Hong Kong, leading to excited chatter about whether the negativity will spill over from the world’s second-largest economy into the global markets and throw a spanner into what was shaping up to be a most delightful and stress-free (at least from the standpoint of one’s investment portfolio) holiday season.
It happened at the end of 2015, with the S&P 500 falling apart on the last two trading days of the year and continuing the swoon through the first weeks of the new year. The majority of broad-market benchmark indexes lost more than 10 percent – the commonly accepted threshold for a technical correction – before sentiment recovered and bargain-hunters swooped in to take advantage of suddenly-cheap valuations.
Minsky Says What?
Share prices on the Shanghai stock exchange have fallen about 6 percent since reaching their high mark for the year on November 22. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index, with a proportionately large exposure to mainland companies, is down by about the same amount. The chart below shows the performance of the SSE and the Hang Seng, relative to the S&P 500, over the past six months.
Financial media pundits were quick to remind their readers of the “China syndrome” that played out, not only during that nasty month of January 2016 but also five months earlier, in August 2015 when Chinese monetary authorities surprised the world with a snap devaluation of the yuan, the domestic currency. It started to seep into the market’s collective consciousness that the phrase “Minsky moment” had been uttered recently in connection with China, drawing parallels to the precariously leveraged financial systems that fell apart during the carnage of 2008 (the late economist Hyman Minsky was known for his observation that prolonged periods of above-average returns in risk asset markets breed complacency, irresponsible behavior and, sooner or later, a nasty and sharp reversal of fortune).
Context is Everything
At least so far, fears of a reprisal of those earlier China-led flights from risk appear to be less than convincing. As the above chart shows, the S&P 500 has blithely plowed ahead with its winning ways despite the pullbacks in Asia. Now, US stocks have shown themselves time and again this year to be resoundingly uninterested in anything except the perpetual narrative of global growth, decent corporate earnings and the prospects for a shareholder grab-bag of goodies courtesy of the US tax code. But ignoring fears of another China blow-up is, it would seem to us, more rational than it is complacent.
For starters, consider the source of that “Minsky moment for China” quote; it came from none other than the head of the central bank of…China. Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the People’s Bank of China, made these remarks during the recent 19th Communist Party Congress marking the start of President Xi Jinping’s second five year term. The spirit of Zhou’s observation was that runaway debt creation imperils the economy’s long-term health, and that is as true for China as it is for any country. In particular, Zhou appeared to be alluding to what many deem to be dangerously high levels of new corporate debt issuers (and speculative investors chasing those higher yields).
Working for the Clampdown
That message was very much in line with one of the overall economic planks of the 19th Congress; namely, that regulatory reform in the financial sector is of greater importance in the coming years than the “growth at any cost” mentality that has characterized much of China’s recent economic history. Following the Congress, the PBOC implemented a new set of regulations to curb access to corporate debt. These regulations sharply restrict access to one of the popular market gimmicks whereby banks buy up high-yielding corporate debt and then on-lend the funds to clients through off-balance sheet “shadow banks.”
These and similar regulations are prudent, but the immediate practical effect was to sharply reduce the supply of available debt and thus send yields soaring. The spike in debt yields, in turn, was widely cited as the main catalyst for the equity sell-offs in Shanghai and Hong Kong.
If that is true, then investors in other markets are likely correct to pay little attention. China does have a debt problem, and if the authorities are serious about “quality growth” – meaning less debt-fueled bridge-to-nowhere infrastructure projects and more domestic consumption – then the risks of a near-term China blow-up should decrease, not increase. Stock markets around the world may pullback for any number of reasons, and sooner or later they most probably will – but a three-peat of the China syndrome should not be high on the list of probable driving forces.
The equity market bulls had been running for more than five years. Over this time interest rates had come down dramatically, inflation was muted and most every fiscal quarter delivered a reasonably predictable uptick in real GDP growth. Markets had weathered a spate of political and financial scandals, as well as occasionally unnerving geopolitical flashpoints. All in all, there seemed to be no particular reason to complain or worry as summer transitioned to fall. Yet investors were edgy. A certain element of caution held in check what should have been giddy times on Wall Street, as if traders and investment bankers, contemplating their seven and eight figure bonuses, couldn’t shake the feeling that it was all a bit unreal. It’s quiet in here, said the young MBAs at Morgan and Salomon to each other as they stared at the monochrome numbers flashing silently on their Quotrons. It’s too quiet.
The previous paragraph could easily be imagined as some future market historian recalling the strange bull market of 2017 – up to the last sentence, anyway. Salomon Brothers is long deceased, and the cathode ray tubes of yesteryear’s Quotrons lie dormant in landfills, patiently awaiting the archaeologists of future millennia. No, the year in question is 1987. On October 19 of that year, a sudden flash of lightning made a direct hit on US equity markets. Major market indexes fell more than 20 percent in one day – the technical definition of a bear market. On October 20, market pros stumbled around the canyons of lower Manhattan asking: What happened?
Thirty years on, another generation of markets pros -- contemplating another secular bull amid low interest rates, steady economic growth and uncomfortably subdued volatility – asks a different question: could it happen again?
A Bear By Any Other Name
The chart below provides a quick snapshot of the Black Monday carnage – and the quick recovery thereafter.
That vertigo-inducing plunge on October 19 put the stock market squarely in bear territory, after a bull run that began in August 1982. But look how quickly the market recovered. By July of 1989 the S&P 500 had regained its pre-crash high. This new bull would go on running for more than a decade, ending only with the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000. For this reason, even though the 1987 market crash was technically a bear market event, we describe it in conversations with clients more as a disruption in the Great Growth Market that ran for 18 years (from 1982 to 2000). We think it is important to make this distinction. Secular bear markets, like the 14 years between 1968 and 1982, call for specific portfolio strategies. But there is very little that one can do about a sudden pullback like Black Monday. To respond to that question we identified above – could a 1987-style event happen again? – our answer is yes. Most certainly it could, and in the next couple paragraphs we will share our thoughts as to why. But a pullback based on some one-off exogenous risk factors – however steep – is not the same thing as a true bear market.
Portfolio Insurance: “Algo” Trading’s Beta Version
So what caused Black Monday? It took quite a while for the market experts of the day to put the pieces of the puzzle together, but in the end they identified the culprit: portfolio insurance. This seemingly benign term encapsulated an approach to institutional portfolio management that involved computer-driven signals to act as warning bells when market conditions appeared risky. Sound familiar? It should, because the crude hedging strategies that made up portfolio insurance circa 1987 were the ancestors of today’s ultra-sophisticated quantitative strategies known by those in the game as “algo” (for “algorithm”) trading.
If you look at the chart above you will see that, a few days before Black Monday, the stock market moved meaningfully lower after soaring to new record highs. For a combination of reasons involving the rate of change in the market’s advances and declines, underlying volatility and a few other factors, the portfolio insurance triggers kicked in and began selling off positions to build hedges. On October 16, the Friday before the crash, the S&P 500 pulled back more than 5 percent as the hedging begat more hedging. On Monday morning the sell orders cascaded in, but there were no buyers. That’s what brought about the carnage.
Peaks and Troughs
Given how much money is currently invested in the offspring of portfolio insurance, the really interesting question is not “could it happen again?” but rather “why hasn’t it happened more often?” For one thing, the ’87 crash did bring about some institutional reforms – operational circuit-breakers and the like – to try and minimize the damage a tidal wave of one-directional orders could bring about. These safeguards have worked on a number of occasions.
For another, the vast diversity of quantitative strategies itself is a kind of check and balance. Every algo program has its own set of triggers: buy when the German Bund does X, sell when Janet Yellen says Y, write a bunch of straddles when China’s monthly FX reserve outflows top $100 million. Put all these out there in the capital markets and they act sort of like the ocean when the peak of one wave collides into the trough of another – they cancel each other out. But that is reassuring only up to a point. It is not hard to imagine that a perfect storm of signals could converge and send all the algo triggers moving in the same direction – everyone wants to sell, no one wants to buy. Crash!
Lessons from the Crash
So, if such a perfect storm were to happen and blindside portfolios with massive short term losses, are there lessons to be learned from 1987? Quite so. It should be clear from the above chart that the worst thing an investor could have done on October 20, 1987 would have been to sell in a panic. In fact, those of us who have been at this long enough to remember the day (and do we ever!) recall that Wall Street’s trading rooms were never more frenzied with buy orders than in the weeks after Black Monday. Portfolio managers may not have yet known exactly why the crash happened – but they knew that the macroeconomic context hadn’t changed, that there were no new geopolitical crises, and that stocks with stratospheric P/E ratios after a long bull run were suddenly super-cheap. That, largely, is what explains the quick recovery, explains why 1987 was not a “real” bear market and explains why, all else remaining more or less unchanged, the prudent response to an out-of-the-blue event is to stay disciplined.
Jackson Hole is, by all accounts, a lovely redoubt, high up in the Rocky Mountains of Wyoming. As has been the case every August since 1978, the monetary mandarins who set the agenda for the world’s central banks will dutifully traipse up to this hiking and skiing paradise next week for their annual economic symposium. The attention span of the global investment community will briefly train its attention on Jackson Hole, and not on account of the riveting topics on tap for keynote speeches and panel confabs. This year’s symposium title is “Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy,” an anodyne and, in this contentious day and age, somewhat wistful formulation. If nothing else, though, it at least rolls off the tongue more easily than last year’s unfortunate word salad of a lead line: “Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the Future.” Central banker says what?
Euron a Roll
No, investors’ interest in the proceedings will be strictly limited to whatever policy utterances may spring forth from the lips of bankers, none more so than European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. A frisson of anticipation rippled in late June from Draghi’s musings about the stronger than expected pace of recovery in the Eurozone. These musings, not unlike Ben Bernanke’s “taper” kerfuffle of May 2013, sent bond markets and the euro into a tizzy as investors imagined the beginning of the end of Eurozone QE. The euro in particular went on a tear, as the chart below illustrates:
So much did the currency respond to fears of a more aggressive QE taper by the ECB that a strong euro has replaced a strong Eurozone as the central bank’s chief concern, as revealed by the most recent ECB minutes published this week. The euro’s strength puts regional companies at a competitive disadvantage for their exports, and complicates the ECB’s elusive target of 2 percent inflation. The characteristically cautious and incremental Draghi is thus likely to be on his guard to avoid any comments that could be interpreted by the market as hawkish policy leanings. Those tuning into the Jackson Hole proceedings may well come away with little more than the bland sentences peppered with bursts of arcane math that make up the majority of central bank speeches. More likely, investors will have to wait until the ECB’s next policy meetings in September and October for guidance on the timing of QE tapering.
The Smell of Fear
Concerns about the euro come at the same time as a smattering of long-dormant volatility comes back into risk asset markets. The CBOE VIX index has found a new home above 15 in recent days – still below the commonly accepted fear threshold of 20, but well above the sub-10 all-time lows it has plumbed for much of the past several months. Global stock indexes have experienced some attendant turbulence in the form of 1 percent-plus intraday pullbacks – fairly tame by historical norms but enough to re-ignite the chatter about the duration of this bull market, expensive valuations and all the rest.
It’s been awhile since shaky asset markets have tested central bankers’ nerves. Nor is there any clear indication that this late summer volatility will develop into anything more than a brief passing thunderstorm or two. But we have sufficient evidence from recent history that the policymakers do react to asset prices. They will likely be wary of pushing too hard for normalization policies (tapering on the part of the ECB, balance sheet reduction and further rate hikes for the Fed) if they sense that such moves will feed into already jittery capital markets.
Chances are that the only “hikes” on the agenda at Jackson Hole will be the kind involving nature’s beauty, not interest rates. We don’t expect much from Wyoming to be moving markets next week. But the central bankers still face a dilemma: how to proceed with the normalization they so want to accomplish when (a) market reactions could be troublesome, and (b) the urgency from a macroeconomic perspective is not clear and present. This will be one of the key contextual themes, we believe, heading into the fall.
Over the past few months, we’ve had a number of conversations with clients that go something like this:
Client: Wow, these are crazy times, huh? Politics! Never seen anything like this!
Us: Yep, they sure are crazy times.
Client: So, why does the stock market keep going up? When should I be worried?
In today’s commentary we will address this concern, and explain why we believe that, whatever one thinks of the political dynamics playing out here at home or abroad, it probably is not a good idea to transpose these sentiments onto a view of portfolio allocation. Political risk is a real thing. But history has shown there to be very little causal relationship between momentous political events and movements in risk asset markets. Any market environment, whether bull or bear, is affected by tens of thousands of variables every day, many of which have little correlation with each other, and very few of which are easy to pinpoint and ascribe to prime mover status. We offer up a case study in support of this claim: the US stock market in the early 1970s that encompassed the Nixon Watergate scandal.
That Dreary Seventies Market
President Nixon resigned from office in August, 1974, shortly after it became clear that Congress was preparing to commence impeachment proceedings in the wake of the revelations about the Watergate crimes and attempted cover-up by the administration. As the chart below shows, the S&P 500 fell quite a bit during the month of August 1974, as well as before and after the Nixon resignation. But the chart also shows that there was a lot else going on at the same time.
The Nixon resignation remains to date the most consequential political scandal in modern American history. It had an earth-shaking effect on the political culture in Washington, leading to far-reaching attempts by lawmakers to restore the integrity of the systems and institutions the scandal had tarnished. As far as markets were concerned, though, Watergate was far down the list of events giving investors headaches. Following a historically unprecedented period of economic growth and rise in living standards over the prior two decades, the first five years of the 1970s witnessed two wrenchingly painful recessions, spiraling inflation and a gut-punch to household budgets in the form of OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo. The freefall in stocks that took place in 1973 and 1974, if it is to be tied to any specific catalyst, flows from the real dollars-and-cents impact of the embargo and the recession. Watergate, as important as it was as a political event, was little more than a blip on a radar screen already filled with bad news.
Tweets Come and Go, Markets Carry On
Which brings us back to today’s daily carnival of the bizarre from the banks of the Potomac Drainage Basin. While the tweets fly and the heads of the high priests of conventional wisdom explode, the economy…well, just chugs along at more or less the same pace it has for the past several years. Today’s initial Q2 GDP reading (2.6 percent, slightly below expectations) sets us up for another year of growth averaging somewhere around 2 percent. The labor market is healthy, there is neither hyperinflation nor deflation, and corporate earnings growth is trending close to double digits. No major world economy appears in imminent danger of a lurch to negative growth.
Yes, stock prices are expensive by most reasonable valuation measures. And yes, there is not much in the way of sector leadership momentum. But until and unless we see compelling signs of a shift away from this uncannily stable macro context, we see little evidence that Washington shenanigans will have much of an impact on stocks. At some point, those tens of thousands of global variables at play will deliver up a different set of considerations and necessitate new strategic thinking. Trying to time the precise market impact, as always, is a fool’s errand.