Posts tagged Us Equity Market
So here we are, with a full array of tricks and treats to test investors’ nerves as the month of October gets rolling. A quick brush-up for our clients and readers on the nature of pullbacks is in order.
Since the current bull market began in 2009 there have been 20 occasions (including the present) where the S&P 500 has retreated by 5 percent or more from its previous high (translating to roughly 2 per year). Of those 20 pullbacks, four met the definition of a technical correction, i.e. 10 percent or more from the high. On one occasion, in 2011, the index fell by more than 18 percent before recovering. As of the Thursday market close, the S&P 500 was down 6.9 percent from its September 20 record high of 2930.
These things happen. As we like to say, paraphrasing Tolstoy, every pullback is dysfunctional in its own special way. With the caveat that the final word on the current reversal has yet to be written, here are four observations we think are worth keeping in mind as this one plays out.
They Finally Got the Memo
As we wrote about in last week’s commentary, the market has been willfully slow, for a very long time, in accepting that the Fed really intends to raise rates consistent with its view of an economy gaining strength. Last week the bond market got the memo with a sudden midweek jump in intermediate yields. It seems that the bond market sat on the memo for a few days before passing it over to the stock market. In any case, we can say with a bit more confidence now that the memo has been received. Barring any significant changes in the macroeconomic landscape – which changes have yet to surface in the form of hard data – the reasonable expectation is for a final 2018 rate hike in December, followed by at least three in 2019.
More Bond Confusion Likely
Despite better alignment between market expectations and the Fed, we do foresee further confusion in fixed income, particularly with intermediate and long duration asset classes. Consider the multiple forces at work on the 10-year Treasury, a widely used proxy for intermediate-long bonds. Heightened inflationary expectations could push yields much higher. On the other hand, relatively attractive yields (compared to Eurobonds or Japanese government bonds, for example) could keep a lid on how high rates go. Any kind of emergent financial crisis could widen spreads between Treasuries, corporate bond and other fixed income classes.
During the economic growth cycle of the late 1990s, from 1995-2000, the average yield on the 10-year Treasury was 6.1 percent and it never fell below 4 percent. What should the “natural” yield be in the current growth cycle? Nobody, not the world’s leading economists and not the trader plugging buy and sell triggers into an algorithmic trading strategy, knows for sure. We’re likely to learn this from whatever we experience over the coming months, not from theoretical foresight.
Post-Sugar High Growth
Come December, we will lap the tax cuts implemented one year earlier. That will make 20 percent corporate earnings growth a thing of the past – a good part of the growth in earnings per share this year was based on the lower tax rate that flowed through to the bottom line of the corporate income statement. Right now, the consensus analyst group used by FactSet, a market research company, expects earnings per share growth for S&P 500 companies to be 7 percent in the first quarter of 2019. Now, the same consensus group predicts that top line sales for these companies in Q1 2019 will come to 6.9 percent. That tells us two things. First, it tells us that the overall global demand environment (reflected by sales) is not expected to worsen much from where it is currently. That’s good news.
The second thing it tells us is that analysts will be focusing obsessively on corporate profit margins in 2019. Sales growth is good, but in the long run sales without profits are not good. Closer parity between top line growth rates and trends further down the income statement suggests that companies will need to be increasingly creative in finding ways to make money, particularly if cost pressures (e.g. on raw materials and labor) continue to trend up.
How will this factor play out? The next few weeks will be very important as the Q3 2018 earnings season gets under way. Analysts will be digesting the most recent growth and profit numbers from corporate America. The narrative could shape up positively – more growth! – or negatively – peak margin! How you as an investor approach 2019 will have much to do with whether you think profit margins really have reached their Everest once and for all. There will be plenty of excitable commentary to that effect. We suggest tuning out the commentary and paying attention to the actual data.
As in, “market leaders going around in circles.” So far the industry sectors bearing the brunt of the October ’18 pullback are the ones that did the lion’s share of the lifting for the past couple years: tech, first and foremost, communications services and consumer discretionary. More broadly, growth stocks have been absolutely dominant for much of the latter period of this bull market. So it is reasonable to ask what might happen if the growth stock leadership falters.
We’ve seen this play out a couple times this year (see our previous commentaries here and here for additional insights on this topic). One of the considerations is that because the tech sector comprises about 25 percent of the total market cap of large cap US stocks, it has an outsize effect on overall direction. That works well when the sector is going up. But if, say, consumer staples stocks in total go up by as much as tech stocks go down, the net result is a down market (since consumer goods stocks make up less than 8 percent of the index). An orderly growth to value rotation might be a better outcome than outright confusion, but investors who have gotten used to the growth-led returns of recent years might be in for a disappointment.
So there’s a lot at play right now. As usual, there will be no shortage of “experts” claiming to understand precisely what it all means (as they claim, after the fact, how “obvious” it was that this pullback was going to happen at exactly this time for exactly this or that reason). As for us, we simply plan on doing what we always do. Study the data, think through the possible alternative outcomes based on the scenarios we have described here as well as others, and always remind ourselves of those numbers we cited at the beginning of this commentary. Pullbacks are a fixture of bull markets and they happen for any number of reasons, logical or not. Actual bear market reversals are much rarer events. In our opinion it is not time to call an end to this bull.
Usually when we append a chart to one of our commentaries, the aim is to shed light on a particular trend. Sometimes, though, the trend in question is actually the lack of a trend, and such is the case this week. Behold the chart below and call up your metaphor of choice: a plate of spaghetti (that multicolored kind with beet, spinach, squid ink etc.), a few tangled skeins of knitting yarn, an attempt at abstract art by a hung-over wannabee Picasso.
Up, Down, All Around
What to make of that tangled web? Healthcare has performed rather well, for no particular reason. Energy has fared poorly of late, despite oil prices near their best levels of the year, just off $80. Otherwise it’s up one day, down the next. Information technology, which has been the main driver of the market’s performance for the better part of the last 18 months, is actually trailing the benchmark index in the most recent three month period.
It’s as if Ms. Market wakes up every morning and flips a coin – heads for risk-on, tails for risk-off. There’s no discernable leadership theme. Remember the “value rotation that wasn’t” about which we wrote earlier in the summer? The forensic evidence is there – note the sharp drawdown in the blue line (representing technology) around the 7/30 time period, which then bounced back up almost immediately. There was no value rotation then, nor in the immediate period after Labor Day when tech fell again while defensive favorites like consumer staples and utilities jumped.
Nowhere Else to Go
What happens in the S&P 500 is increasingly important, because there are few other refuges for risk-on portfolios. For much of this year we had a strong leadership trend in domestic small cap stocks. The Russell 2000 small cap index is still ahead of the S&P 500 year to date, but the outperformance trend ran out of steam a couple months back, as the chart below shows.
We do see something of an uptrend in non-US stocks over the past couple weeks, but there are reasons for not being too excited about an imminent mean reversion of any meaningful duration here. Most of the juice in the MSCI EAFE (gold) and Emerging Markets (purple) in this recent trend is coming from a weaker dollar versus other currencies. That in itself is counterintuitive. US interest rates have been rising, with the 10-year Treasury now comfortably over 3 percent and the 2-year steadily continuing its ascent ahead of an expected rate hike when the Federal Open Market Committee meets next week. Higher interest rates are normally a bullish signal for the home currency, attracting investment income from abroad. But no – the dollar has confounded rational investors by retreating while interest rates rise. We illustrate this in the chart below.
Going back to that first chart with the chaotic sector spaghetti, we can be thankful that the overall directional trend of US large cap stocks remains resolutely upwards. Who cares what’s ahead and what’s behind, as long as everything more or less moves in the same positive direction – right? And to be clear, the broader story remains largely the same. Good job numbers, good growth, strong corporate sales and earnings – the narrative, like The Dude Lebowski, abides. But at some point one wants to see that tangle of price trends turn into a clearer picture with a rational supporting narrative. Is it finally time for value investors to come into the sunshine? Could a value trend sustain the bull market for another cycle before it gives up the ghost? Or is this just a phase of directionlessness before the tech giants reassert themselves for yet another gravity-defying cycle of outperformance? Stay tuned. And happy autumnal equinox!
Round numbers and anniversaries…the little human foibles so beloved of our financial chattering class. This past week, of course, marked the 10-year anniversary of the great collapse of the House of Lehman. No surprise, then, that the print and digital channels were all atwitter (pun partially intended) with reminiscing and ruminating about the crash and all that has happened since. There is a plentiful supply of topics, to be sure. Channeling the Mike Myers’ “Coffee Talk” character on SNL: “Negative interest rates led us to the other side of the Looking Glass. Tawk amuhngst yuh-selves.”
Supercalifragilistic S&P 500
One fact of life to which we and everyone else who manages money are highly attuned is the remarkable outperformance of US equities relative to the rest of the world over this time period. For a while in the early years of the recovery geographic asset classes traded off market leadership in the usual way, rewarding traditional asset class diversification strategies. But sometime in 2012 that all changed. US stocks went on a tear and haven’t looked back. The chart below shows the trajectory of the S&P 500 against broad market indexes for developed Europe, Asia and emerging markets from 2009 to the present.
That’s a huge delta. The S&P 500 cumulatively returned about twice what the non-US indexes earned over this nine and a half year span of time. The difference is even more profound when you adjust for risk. All three non-US indexes exhibited higher volatility (i.e. risk) than the US benchmark. The standard deviation of returns for the MSCI EM index was more than 19 percent, just under 18 percent for developed Europe and 14 percent for developed Asia, while it was just 12.3 percent for the S&P 500. Twice the return for much less risk…sounds like one of those free lunches that are supposed to never exist, doesn’t it?
What Goes Up…Right?
And that, of course, is the big question. Since we are trained to believe that free lunches only exist at picnics hosted by the tooth fairy and the Easter bunny, we look at that chart and wonder when the law of gravity will reassert itself. Asset class price patterns over a long enough time horizon typically revert to mean. What goes up eventually comes down.
But asset prices are not bound by the same fixed laws as those governing physical objects in actual space-time. Economists and financial market theorists may suffer from all the “physics envy” they want – it won’t make asset prices any more rational or predictable. In fact, the “higher risk, higher return” mantra fails in the case of emerging markets versus US stocks over even longer periods, going back to when the former became a sufficiently liquid tradable asset to be a candidate for long-term diversified portfolios.
Mean reversion tends to work best when the primary evaluation criterion is the relative valuation metric between two assets. If Company ABC has a price to earnings (P/E) ratio of 30 and Company XYZ, a competitor in the same industry, has a price to earnings ratio of 10, then investors would at some point expect the price of XYZ to rise relative to ABC. But increasingly we see evidence that daily market trading is not dominated by stock-specific valuation considerations but rather by macro narratives. Continued demand for US equities is simply driven by a better “story” according to this narrative – strong corporate financial results and an economy that is growing faster than elsewhere in the developed world. The same thinking says that the US is a safer bet than elsewhere if the worst-case scenario for a trade war plays out. ETFs and other passive investment vehicles afford the opportunity to take these kinds of broad bets without paying any attention to whether, say, Unilever (a Dutch company) has a more attractive valuation profile than US-domiciled Procter & Gamble.
There are plenty of individual assets in many non-US markets that look attractive on the basis of relative valuations. We do not sense, however, that we are at a clear and compelling turning point justifying a significant re-weighting of asset class weights among diverse geographies.
This past Wednesday, apparently, was one of those red-letter special days in US stock market history. The current bull market, which began in 2009, became the longest on record, based on the daily closing price of the S&P 500. So said the chattering heads, not just on CNBC but on your friendly local news channel. Hooray! Or should we worry, perhaps, that the good times are coming to an end?
The right answer to that question and all others about the bull market’s record longevity is to ignore it, because technically it didn’t happen. Nope, this is not the longest bull market on record, not by a long shot. Now, some may quibble when we present the facts, arguing that we are splitting hairs. Well, sorry, but ours is supposed to be a precise business where performance measurements are concerned. And facts, surprisingly enough in this day and age, are still facts.
So, to be precise, the bull market that reached its peak on March 24, 2000 (the one we supposedly beat on Wednesday) did not in fact begin on October 11, 1990. That was a span of 3,452 days. The basis for “longest bull market ever” claims made this week is that 3,453 days elapsed from March 9, 2009 (the low point of the last bear market) to August 22, 2018. However! Based on the technical definition of bulls and bears, the bull that peaked in March 2000 actually began, not in 1990, but on December 4, 1987. That’s a total span of 4,494 days, or 1,041 days (about 2.8 years if you prefer) longer than our current bull market.
So why did the media spend so much energy this week talking about the “longest bull market?” Because (a) it’s more fun to talk about things grand and historical than about the daily grind of random market movements, and (b) on October 11, 1990 the S&P 500 closed down 19.9 percent from the previous record high set in July of that year, and, well, 19.9 percent is close enough to 20 percent, which is the commonly accepted technical threshold of a bear market.
Let the quibbling begin! 19.9 percent is close to 20 percent, certainly. But it never passed that threshold. More importantly, the stock market pullback of 1990 (which started with the recession of that year but had recovered before the recession was over) never spent a single day – not a single day! – in actual bear market territory. You can’t say that a bull market began the day after a bear market ended when that bear market never even began.
So, again sticking to the definition of a 20 percent pullback from the prior high, the last bear market before the dot-com crash of 2000 occurred after Black Monday in 1987. On December 4 of that year the S&P 500 had retreated 33.5 percent from the prior record high reached in August. That wasn’t a super-long bear, lasting less than a couple months from the breaching of 20 percent, but it was certainly impactful.
The Music of the Market
Here’s the more important reason why we’re not just splitting hairs over the 19.9 versus 20 percent, though. If you look at the way markets trend over a long enough period of time you notice a certain pattern – a tune, if you will, the music of the market. Every bull market experiences periodic pullbacks. These happen for a variety of reasons, some of which may seem frivolous and some of which may seem more serious at the time. Traders in the market are highly attuned to how far these pullbacks draw down from the previous bull market high. A 5 percent pullback is deemed significant. The 10 percent threshold has its own special name – correction. And the 20 percent level, as we noted above, is the event horizon for a bear market.
What tends to happen during the more severe bull market corrections is that they get ever so close to the 20 percent threshold without actually going over it. This happened in October 1990, as we showed above. It also happened in August 1998 with a 19.3 percent pullback (this coincided with the Russian debt default and subsequent meltdown of hedge fund LTCM). More recently, it happened in 2011 with a 19.4 percent pullback in the S&P 500 while the Eurozone crisis and US debt ceiling debacle played out simultaneously.
It’s not accidental that these pullbacks flirt with bear markets but refrain from going all the way. It’s how short term trading programs, which make up the lion’s share of day to day liquidity, are set up to work. A correction or bear market threshold is considered to be a technical support level. If prices approach, but don’t breach the support level it means that the net consensus of the market supports the status quo; in other words, that conditions continue to justify a bull market. These pullback-recovery movements happen frequently. Real bear markets are much rarer, and more durable when they do happen.
The chart below provides a good illustration of this “music” – it shows the price trend of the S&P 500 from 1987 to the present (lognormal scale to provide consistency in magnitude of returns over time).
This chart is instructive for another reason. To paraphrase Tolstoy, every pullback has its own dysfunctional story. What causes a pullback to become a full-on bear market? It’s not always a recession – witness 1990, when we had an economic downturn but only a limited market pullback. It’s not always a financial crisis – we had one of those in 1998 and again in 2011 but in both cases economic growth stayed positive. In 1987 financial markets came close to shutting down, but again the economy was still resilient and the drawdown, while intense, turned out to be brief. By contrast, in 2000-02 and again in 2007-09 we got a double-dose of financial crisis and recession in roughly the same time frame (the grey bands in the above chart signify recession periods). Both the magnitude and the duration of these drawdowns, of course, were more severe.
In any event, with all apologies to financial market pundits everywhere, there was nothing particularly historical about this week. Perhaps our good fortune will last another 1,039 (and counting) days and we will have a real, actual “longest bull” to celebrate. Or maybe not. Expect more pullbacks along the way in either case. Remember that most pullbacks do not end up in a real bear market, and also remember that while we humans have a need to read meaning into calendar events, markets themselves do not.
The languid dog days of August are truly upon us. Risk asset markets would seem to be feeling the soul-draining humidity as much as runners and cyclists slogging through day after day of relentlessly damp blankets of heat while training for fall goal races. The S&P 500 hovers just below its January record high, while volatility has resumed last year’s deep slumber. The 10-year Treasury yield casts a sleepy glance every now and then at the 3 percent level, yawns and goes supine again somewhere around 2.95 percent.
Random headlines make a splash on these days where nothing much from macroeconomic or corporate earnings data releases manage to perk up investor attention. This week’s little diversion came – as seemingly all diversions in 2018 must come – from Twitter and specifically from the account of Elon Musk, founder of Tesla, as he mused about the likelihood of taking his $60 billion enterprise private. Now, once upon a time a major strategic undertaking like taking a public company private would have simmered under the radar in boardrooms and hushed discussions with bankers, lawyers and advisors before proceeding in an orderly fashion into the public domain. But such are the times in which we live.
Mind The (Listing) Gap
While Musk’s method of communication may have been unusual (and quite possibly illegal), the decision itself – to take a public company private – is anything but an anomaly. Our interest piqued, we went hunting for some data on the subject and came across a 2017 Credit Suisse paper entitled “The Incredible Shrinking Universe of U.S. Stocks” with some eye-opening facts and figures. The universe of publicly traded equities – i.e. shares of common stock traded on an accredited stock exchange, compliant with SEC disclosure and transparency regulations, and available for purchase by any institutional or retail investor – has radically diminished over the past several decades.
Here’s a good illustration of what this means in practical terms. How many stocks do you think make up the Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index? Ah – you were about to say “5,000, of course!” but then realized it must be a trick question if we’re asking it. Indeed, this bellwether index launched in 1970 to represent the “total US stock market” does not consist of 5,000 companies. It consists of 3,486 companies as of June 30, 2018. Why? Because that is roughly how many publicly traded companies exist in the United States. In 1976 there were about 4,800 companies with publicly traded stock, and in 1998 that number soared to more than 7,500. The Wilshire 5000 reached its peak holdings with 7,562 names on July 31 of that year.
Where Did They All Go?
Why are there so many fewer listed companies now, and how much does it actually matter from the standpoint of an investor seeking to capture as wide a swath of global wealth as possible through portfolio diversification? The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward. The second – not so much.
The main reason why there are fewer companies on stock exchanges in 2018 than there were in 1998 or 1978 is twofold. First, mergers & acquisitions (M&A) activity has gone gangbusters over this period, and has been the main driver for delisting (a company, when acquired, naturally retires its stock ticker at the signing ceremony). Second, initial public offering (IPO) activity has fallen. If M&A is the main way that a company falls off the stock exchange, then IPOs are the main source for new supply. According to the Credit Suisse report we noted above, the average number of IPOs every year from 1976 to 2000 was 282. From 2000 to the present the average annual number was a mere 114.
Long story short – M&A fever has raged while the IPO market has slumbered. This in itself is unusual. Historically, strong equity markets tended to encourage both M&A and IPOs. That makes sense – companies feeling flush look to bulk up by taking out competitors or to buy their way into new industries, while start-up founders want to cash in with the high valuations available in bull markets. But that positive correlation no longer holds. From 1976 to 2000 the correlation between M&A and IPO activity was 0.87 (1.0 being perfect positive correlation). From 2007 to 2016, the correlation is actually negative: minus 0.08. Those start-up founders apparently have other, more enticing options for cashing in.
The Changing Market For Private Capital
And indeed, those alternatives exist. Probably the most noteworthy, in terms of explaining the diminished attractiveness of IPOs, is the growth of late-stage venture capital / private equity. Venture capital used to be concentrated in the early years of a start-up company’s history, with the VCs motivated to get their investments through successive funding rounds and out the door into the public markets via IPO as fast as possible. Now there is a whole distinct asset class of late-stage private investors. This includes most of the major mutual fund families, like Fidelity and BlackRock, that operate dedicated late stage private equity funds. This asset class provides a level of liquidity that previously could be found only in public markets. For example, late stage private deals allow start-up founders and their employees to cash out some of their stock and options – again, reducing the natural pressure to go public.
The Implications for Asset Allocation
So the story about how we wound up with so many fewer public companies is relatively easy to understand. But that second question we posed a few paragraphs ago remains outstanding. Is the long term investor with a diversified portfolio missing out on a major asset class exposure by not being invested in private equity?
This is a question we take seriously: after all, our primary job is to construct portfolios with a prudent level of diversification aligned with each client’s specific investment objectives and risk considerations. The data thus far are somewhat inconclusive, with attendant benefits and costs.
For example, while there may be fewer publicly traded companies out there, the total market capitalization of the US stock market is more than 1.35 times the value of US real gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, total market cap in 1976 was just 0.47 times GDP, and in the late 1990s, when the number of listed firms peaked, it was 1.05 times. The collective profits of all listed firms today is close to 9 percent of GDP versus 7 percent in 1976. And share volume – hence liquidity – is at record levels today.
For investors there are other potential downsides to owning private equity, including reduced transparency and less consistent, available data for performance benchmarking. On the other hand, it is not possible to simply dismiss the reality of a new structure to the US capital market and the existence of distinct new asset classes large enough to demand consideration, if not inclusion, for long term diversified portfolios. We will have more to say about this in the coming weeks and months.